Везде
Kantian Appearances, Intentional Gegenstände, and Some Varieties of Phenomenalism
Оглавление
Аннотация Оценить Содержание публикации
Библиография Комментарии
Поделиться
QR
Метрика
Kantian Appearances, Intentional Gegenstände, and Some Varieties of Phenomenalism
Аннотация
Код статьи
S123456780010216-8-1
DOI
10.18254/S271326680010216-8
Тип публикации
Статья
Статус публикации
Опубликовано
Авторы
Аквила Ричард  
Аффилиация: Университет Теннеси
Адрес: Соединенные Штаты Америки
Выпуск
Том 1 Выпуск 1
Аннотация

Задачей данного текста является развитие некоторых новых альтернатив феноменалистского прочтения Канта. Что, конечно, включает в себя рассматривание обыденных эмпирически реальных вещей в качестве “явлений”. Однако я начну с кантовского взгляда на “явления” как на (каким бы то ни было способом, по крайней мере, возможные) явления обыденных вещей. Выражая это в гуссерлевской терминологии, я рассматриваю их в качестве “ноэматического коррелята” фундаментального модуса направленности, порожденного чисто эстетическим ноэзисом. Соответственно, вместе с новым прочтением "трансцендентального предмета  = X",  открываются новые возможности для Канта-феноменалиста рассматривать эмпрически реальные объекты как что то большее, нежели чем просто "логические конструкты" из "явлений" эстетики, при этом не рассматривая эти объекты, как нечто существующее в себе.

Ключевые слова
Кант, явления, интенциональные объекты, ноэзис/ноэма, трансцендентальный объект = Х
Классификатор
Получено
21.06.2020
Дата публикации
06.07.2020
Всего подписок
30
Всего просмотров
1622
Оценка читателей
0.0 (0 голосов)
Цитировать Скачать pdf
Доступ к дополнительным сервисам
Дополнительные сервисы только на эту статью
Преимущества сервисов
100 руб. / 1.0 SU
1 Kantian Appearances, Intentional Gegenstände,1 and Some Varieties of Phenomenalism
1. As Professor Katrechko emphasizes, the English term ‘object’ might be used to translate either Gegenstand or Objekt. One may discuss whether there is anything like a consistent distinction with regard to the latter in Kant. In any case, where the term is used outside of quotations from Kant, the term Gegenstand is used here to speak of “objects” in a purely “semantic” or “intentionalistic” sense. Its insertion into quotations from Kant is simply for the reader’s information, without presumption as to whether Kant might in that particular passage have something further in mind. To avoid confusion, I avoid using the English term ‘object’ in any other sense.
2 Introduction
3 After some preparation, I will propose a variety of ways of regarding Kant as a phenomenalist. This of course concerns the status of ordinary, empirically real things as “appearances.” But I will begin with Kant’s view of “appearances” as (on any occasion, at least possibly) appearances of ordinary things. Putting the point by way of some Husserlian terminology,2 I will be taking appearances in the sense in question (or perhaps, more strictly, appearance) to be a mere “noematic correlate” – correlate on the “Gegenstand” (or at least proto-Gegenstand) side of consciousness – of a fundamental mode of directedness borne by a type of “noesis” introduced in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Despite the fact that Kant presents the latter as a merely “receptive” aspect of cognition, it is therefore borne, as I take it, by a fundamental mode of mental “action.”3
2. This is not to say that Husserl read Kant in these terms. In what follows, I also use the term ‘consciousness’ in a sense broader than what Kant himself generally (but not exclusively) means by Bewusstsein.

3. That Kant has inherited no terminology apt for bringing out the special sort of “action” in question may be regarded as evidenced by his somewhat desperate use of the terms ‘space’ and ‘time’ to refer, not to anything like what we would normally associate with those terms, but rather precisely to something on the noetic side of the cognitive process. Indeed, in addition to using them to refer to a feature internal to the cognitive process – “essential property of our sensibility” (IV, 287) – he speaks of “space” and “time” as something by means of (vermittelst) which a certain cognitive (or proto-cognitive) upshot is achieved (A89/B121; IV, 283, 287, cf. 318). And we even encounter such formulations as that space is, or is nothing other than, “the Anschauung of mere form” or “the consciousness of one’s own receptivity for sensing” (emphasis added) or “of the real relation of myself a priori to other things”: respectively, (Refl. 4673) and “Leningrad Fragment” [Kant 2005, p. 155, 365].
4 What I take to be, in this respect, in question in the Aesthetic is a mode of directedness that is (a) of itself independent of the ontological status of its target/Gegenstand; and (b) constitutive of vehicles susceptible to both non-conceptual, but on that basis also conceptual, enrichment, and so of internal transformations constitutive of noematically correlative dimensions of meaning or sense. In turn, (c) regarding this mode of directedness as the a priori “form” of the mental vehicles in question, and so as in itself undetermined with respect to antecedent “content” in a mental state,4 this opens new possibilities not only with respect to a phenomenalistic view of empirical reality, but more specifically with respect to a view of it as comprised of merely “intentional Gegenstände,” as opposed to “logical constructs” out of such things. At the same time, it opens a new possibility for how Kant might be both a phenomenalist and a transcendental realist regarding empirically real things. Or as it might be better put from the noetic side: how the fundamental directedness underlying reference to empirically real things, even phenomenalistically construed, might also be regarded as some kind of directedness – even if without the possibility of actual reference – toward something existing in itself.5
4. In the relevant sense, even pure space and time are at most “content” in the sense of being noematic correlates of the possession of this form by a (or by an at least human) mental state. But see the preceding note.

5. I have previously argued point (b) in [Aquila, 2013] and point (c), though with less solid grounding, in [Aquila, 2016]. See also [Aquila, 2003] The following also seems to me still useful in some ways, although also perhaps unforgivably simplistic at some points: [Aquila, 1989]. (Point [a] has remained a constant throughout.)
5 I begin in section 1 with brief discussion of the Aesthetic, and then in section 2 introduce what I take to be a neglected possibility for Kantian phenomenalism. Section 3 is then the heart of the matter. In it, I argue that Kant’s notion of the transcendental Gegenstand = X is an attempt to express the need for a certain sort of intellectual transformation of the fundamental mode of directedness toward appearance introduced in the Aesthetic. In section 4 I apply the point to some varieties of phenomenalism.
6 1. “Subjective” Appearances as Intentional Gegenstände
7 As I will argue, the Aesthetic introduces the notion of mental states possessed, on a pre-intellectual level, of an irreducible intrinsic Gegenstand-directedness; or at least of such directedness as might, upon satisfaction of further conditions, be made into genuine “Gegenstand”-directedness. I will refer to this as “aesthetic directedness” and speak of the “pure” or a priori “form” of such directedness. This notion might seem troubling to some, so before turning to the Kantian text, I will try to forestall some initial misunderstandings.
8 First, as already suggested, I am not equating the notion of a mental directedness, in the absence of at least certain intellectual conditions, with that of genuine mental reference. But one may of course still be uneasy with the suggestion that, without any intellectual form or content, we might have states with some sort of mental “directedness”; or at least, as we might put it, directedness at least capable of becoming, under the appropriate conditions, “mental.” Here I simply note that there is no reason to regard intellect as the only possible source of cognitive enrichment for a state with the form of aesthetic directedness. Of course, even attempting to read Kant along anything like the line so far suggested, we are assuming that such a state (in the case of empirical Anschauung)6 might at least contain sensation as an ingredient. But given the cognitively minimal status of sensation in Kant, this will presumably not help those in the grip of the present unease. As I have argued elsewhere,7 however, there is reason to see Kant as having recognized the possibility, and indeed the need, for aesthetically directed states to contain, on a pre-intellectual level, and as ingredients as genuinely internal to them as sensations are to empirical Anschauung, manifolds of anticipations and retentions (which might otherwise be deemed “mere associations”) – precisely as a condition for the possibility of perceptual fields within which any sorts of discriminations are possible.
6. I take the English term ‘intuition’ to be sufficiently misleading to advise sticking in general with Anschauung. Kant uses the latter mainly for: what we might call “intuitings,” or cases of intuiting; our capacity for such; and what might be called the intuiteds that are Gegenstände (or Objekte) of the intuitings in question. With the latter way of putting things, I follow the practice e.g. of Wilfrid Sellars; cf. [Sellars, 1968, p. 8]. In any case, Kant frequently uses anschauen to speak of “intuiting” all sorts of things: appearances, the manifold of appearances, space and time, particular spaces, determinations or relations of things, objects (Gegenstände, A27/B43, A93/B125, A293/B350, A490/B518; Objekte A38/B55), things in themselves (at least possibly), things intuited “under” the pure forms of intuition, and things or objects intuited in space and time (A30/B45, B147, A373, A490/B518), such as drops of water (A263-4/B319). And he frequently speaks of “objects of” our Anschauung, specifically as of sensible Anschauung (Bxxvi [Objekt], A27/B43, A35/B52, A51/B75, A90/B122, A772/B800) or simply as of Anschauung (B71, A79/B105, B110, B148, B150, A326/B382, A428-9/B456-7, A538/B566, A444/B472).

7. Cf. [Aquila, 2013, p. 19] and [Aquila, 1989].
9 A further preliminary point is that, whether or not one feels comfortable with the notion of mental directedness in the absence of at least some minimal intellectual conditions, I am not supposing that, in arguing for a pure form of aesthetic directedness, Kant is arguing for even a minimal level of apprehension of “appearances.” In particular, it seems to me likely that, apart from satisfaction of further conditions, the “Gegenstand” of whatever directedness might be in question would be at most a holistic “appearance” within which appearances are in principle discriminable: arguably, what he calls the “undetermined object [Gegenstand] of an empirical Anschauung” (A20/B34). On the other hand, and as I have also argued elsewhere, it is far from clear that satisfaction of specifically intellectual conditions, or at least conditions involving full-blown concepts, is required to achieve at least certain minimal discriminations within such a holistic Gegenstand. Here I would simply note that, apart from the question of a possible need for intellectual (if not conceptual) conditions as well, this is a point at which a state bearing the form of aesthetic directedness arguably needs to contain, nested within itself – and again, within itself just as integrally as it contains a manifold of sensations – a manifold of sub-states of which each also (and indeed with perhaps more than one layer of such nesting) bears the form of aesthetic directedness.8
8. I have discussed this in [Aquila, 2013, p. 9].
10 Before turning more specifically to the Aesthetic, and anticipating my eventual suggestions regarding Kantian phenomenalism, it will be useful to keep the following distinction in mind. I formulate it as two views regarding “subjective appearances.”
11 Subjective Appearances The noematic correlate of aesthetic directedness insofar as it is borne by states containing sensation as at least part of their internal material, and that can in any instance be regarded as at least possibly appearances of things affecting one’s senses.9
9. Here I set aside the possibility of what one might regard as physical appearances of empirically real things (e.g. images in a telescope, or in one’s eyes). This possibility was suggested to me by Sergey Katrechko.
12 Two Views of Subjective Appearances as “Intentional Gegenstände” Phenomenologically Minimal View Subjective appearances are the noematic correlate of an aesthetic directedness by virtue of which it is left open whether, in general or at least in particular cases, those appearances are anything more than merely possible appearances of things affecting one’s senses.
13 (PB) Phenomenal Bivalence View Subjective appearances are the noematic correlate of an aesthetic directedness by virtue of which it is left open whether, in general or at least in particular cases, those appearances are, in addition to being possible appearances of things affecting one’s senses, also themselves things affecting one’s senses.
14 Given that subjective appearances have been introduced as “intentional Gegenstände,” it might seem that (PB) is not even intelligible. This is a question to which I will return in the next section. In any case, while both of the views just articulated leave it open what prospects there might be for an intentionalistic view of empirical reality, it may of course be gathered from the introduction of (PB) that I take these prospects to extend beyond what might normally be considered. In the meantime, it is important to note, first, that both approaches are compatible with the fact that Kant generally restricts the term Empfindung to cases in which the latter’s origin is the actual effect of something upon a perceiver.10 In addition, apart from possible unclarity in Kant himself, it is important not to suppose that subjective appearances are on either approach to be equated with sensations, or to be regarded as made or formed out of them. (There might be a particular temptation in this direction on the P-minimal approach.)
10. However, it is also possible that Kant does at least sometimes uses the term Empfindung for an aspect of appearances, introduced as above, in a particular way “corresponding” to, or correlative with, the presence of effects upon a perceiver, insofar as the latter are capable of serving as the matter or medium for aesthetic directedness; see e.g. my [Aquila, 1982]. In any case, Kant grants in the second-edition Refutation of Idealism that “From the fact that the existence of outer objects [Gegenstände] is required for the possibility of a determinate consciousness of our self it does not follow that every intuitive representation of outer things includes at the same time their existence, for that may well be the mere effect of the imagination (in dreams as well as in delusions)…” (B278). Cf.: “The difference between truth and dream, however, is not decided through the quality of the representations that are referred to objects [Gegenstände], for they are the same in both... (Prol, Remark III to Part One, IV, 290). Translations from the Prolegomena are those of [Kant, 2002].
15 I have commented elsewhere on several passages that seem to me to support (PB).11 Here I highlight a few of them.
11. “The Transcendental Idealisms of Kant and Sartre,” pp. 222ff (there putting the point, however, with somewhat different terminology).
16 Sense represents the appearances empirically in perception, the imagination in association (and reproduction [i.e., eventual arrival at appearances associated with given ones, insofar as recognition of an object might thereby be effectuated]), and apperception in the empirical consciousness of the identity of these reproductive representations with the appearances through which they were given, hence in recognition. (A115; italics and bracketed gloss are my own; bold text in original.)12
12. Translations from the first Critique are those of Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
17 Kant does not simply speak here of the identity of something through a manifold of appearances associated with a given one, but rather of an identity of the antecedent with the subsequent appearances. They are, presumably, from the point of view in question one and the same thing, despite being from another point of view a manifold of appearances. Similarly:
18 Our apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive, and is therefore always changing. We can therefore never determine from this alone whether this manifold [my emphasis], as object [Gegenstand] of experience [my emphasis], is simultaneous or successive, if something does not ground it which always exists. (A182/B225)
19 Here that which lies in the successive apprehension is considered as representation, but the appearance that is given to me, in spite of the fact that it is nothing more than a sum of these representations, is considered as their object. (A191/B236, emphasis added; cf. A370)
20 An unpublished formulation of the argument of the second-edition Refutation of Idealism also seems to make sense only in terms of (s-o B). There, as in the Critique, Kant rejects the supposition that we possess only an inner sense, and not also an outer sense immediately directed toward bodies in space. But what he adds to the way he puts it in the published version of the argument is that the rejected alternative would be tantamount to transforming the very space of bodies into the “form of inner sense.” That is, on the rejected alternative, “space itself would be time” (Refl. 5653, XVIII: 310]); “the representation of space would be transformed (verwandelt) into a representation of time, i.e., it would be possible to represent space as a time...” (Refl. 6311, XVIII: 611; cf. 5655, XVIII: 314-5, and 6315, XVIII: 618-19). The supposition thus seems to be that we are given bodies in space only to the extent that what we are given – those very appearances – would all be, under a certain counterfactual supposition, no more than “inner” appearances.
21 Arguably, (PB) is also implicit in Kant’s distinction between the mathematical and dynamical categories, and the corresponding a priori principles. Kant says that the mathematical categories and principles are “concerned with objects [Gegenstände] of intuition (pure as well as empirical),” while the dynamical are “directed at the existence of these objects” (B110; my emphasis); the former “pertain merely to the intuition,” the latter “to the existence,” of appearances (A160/B199; Kant’s emphases). Thus specifically, the Analogies of Experience “do not concern the appearances and the synthesis of their empirical intuition, but merely their existence and their relation to one another with regard to this their existence” (A178/B220; Kant’s emphases). Otherwise put, while the mathematical principles pertain to appearances “with regard to their mere possibility,” that is, with respect to “their intuition and the real (dem Realen)13 in their perception” (A178/B221), the Analogies “bring the existence (Dasein) of appearances under rules a priori” (A179/B221).
13. Here of course “the real in their perception” (dem Realen ihrer Wahrnehmung) does not mean actual as opposed to possible existence (Dasein), but simply refers to that in an appearance which, corresponding to sensation, always has a certain “intensive magnitude” or degree of intensity (A166ff/B207ff; cf. A143/B182).
22 Here one may of course object by noting that that nothing like (PB) would follow just from granting that, in addition to being candidates for determination as ordinary appearing things, or even as appearances thereof (at least in the sense of being such things qua appearing), the appearances in question are also at least in principle candidates for determination as merely possibly such things (or merely possibly appearances thereof). For why not simply suppose, after all, that those appearances which are “candidates” for determination as ordinary appearing things, with respect to their actual existence, simply are (with the rare exception of hallucination) indeed just such things? In that case, Kant would only be saying that the mathematical principles are grounded in a concern with the possibility of things qua apparent in intuition, but without regard to conditions for judgment as to their actual existence; the dynamical are concerned with just those conditions. But it seems to me that we would then be taking Kant not to be trying to say anything positive here – as he seems to want to do – as to the actual import of the mathematical principles.14
14. Thus the mathematical principles are said to teach “how both their [i.e. appearances’] intuition and the real in their perception could be generated (erzeugt) in accordance with rules” (A178/B221); cf. Prol, § 26 (IV, 309-10): the mathematical principles “refer to the genesis (Erzeugung) of intuitions.” And Kant’s emphasis on independence from questions of existence is presumably meant to refer back to his emphasis on the fact that the mathematical principles are grounded in our positive ability to learn precisely from intuiting something “prior to the existence” of the Gegenstände of the Anschauung in question (A26/B42). In any case, I argue later, in connection with Kant’s introduction of the transcendental Gegenstand = X, that the notion of Erzeugung with respect to an Anschauung may carry an insufficiently appreciated import.
23 But to turn now finally to the Aesthetic. It begins with characterization of Anschauung as “that through which [cognition] relates immediately to [Gegenstände], and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end”; or, following Pluhar’s translation15: “at which all thought aims as a means” (als Mittel abzweckt). And Kant immediately adds that this is in turn possible only if the Gegenstand “affects the mind in a certain way” (A19/B33). Just as readers would expect, Kant is thus speaking out of a concern for cognition as a way of relating to things capable of actually affecting one’s senses. And this, he tells us, requires what he calls Anschauung, as something to which our power of thought must in further turn be able to relate. But then he goes on to define our faculty of sensibility as the capacity to acquire representations through “the way [emphasis added] in which we are affected” by things. Although it may seem a trivial point, we might note that Kant does not simply speak here of the capacity to acquire representations through being affected, or through certain effects upon us. At least arguably, the otherwise seemingly cumbersome phrase, and its reference to capacity (and as repeated shortly thereafter), is meant to suggest that there is something essential specifically about the way in which we are affected when we are cognitively related to things through such affection, something essential to our capacity for being so related beyond the fact that we are affected by them.
15. See: [Kant, 1996].
24 Then Kant goes on to define Empfindung as “The effect of an object [Gegenstandes] on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it.” Again, he speaks of the effect on our capacity for representation. He could of course simply have spoken of an effect on us, insofar as we are able to be related to the cause through that effect. The point of his choice of formulation is arguably to introduce the idea that, already on this level of pre-intellectual doings, what makes it possible to be cognitively related to something through sensation is that, in giving rise to the sensation in question, it must thereby also give rise to something possessed of a character of its own by virtue of which it is able to relate to something through sensation.
25 The point is reinforced by Kant’s speaking of the effect of something “insofar as we are affected by it.” Arguably, again, he is distinguishing between the whole of what arises from one’s being affected, insofar as that is an activation of our capacity for being cognitively related to something through the effect in question, and a part or aspect of that upshot specifically involving our being affected but considered apart from the special way to which he is trying to call our attention. If, as he subsequently suggests, we think of these two parts or aspects as “form”16 and “matter,” and think of the form precisely as the special “way in which the subject is affected,” essential to the capacity for reference to things through being affected, then he is saying that he will call the specifically material aspect sensation. Could we then suppose that the formal aspect does not of itself involve some mode of mental directedness, susceptible to activation precisely through the medium of that material aspect? Although there is no space to elaborate on the point here, it seems to me obvious that, to the contrary of the alternative that I am trying to defend, this would make no sense in light of what Kant goes on to say about matter and form in Anschauung with respect to the possibility of a priori cognition. In particular, it seems not to fit with the conclusion that he immediately draws, regarding the presence, by virtue of the presence of mere “form” of Anschauung, of a cognitive (or at least potentially cognitive) relation to something to which we are a priori able to apply our intellect in the obtaining of cognition, namely (as he eventually makes clear), the space and time within which we are able to locate things (and possible locations for them).
16. Kant may admittedly use the term Form der Anschauung almost exclusively for space and time, insofar as they are something a priori, and thus apparently equating it with “form of appearance.” But on the other hand, he also uses those terms to refer to something precisely on the noetic side. See note 2 above. In any case, that Kant regards sensations as actually incorporable within states possessed a character of directedness through them, and not simply as something that makes states of the latter sort possible by standing in some particular external relation to them, is strongly suggested by his description of “an” empirical consciousness as one “in which there is at the same time sensation” (B207; my emphasis). Here I take it he does not simply mean that any capacity for empirical consciousness contains the capacity for sensations. For he also speaks of the “apprehension” of appearances – their being “taken up into empirical consciousness” (B202) – as taking place at least partly by means of sensation at any moment (A167/B 209, A 168/B 210; emphases added).
26 [Because the text on which the following two paragraphs are based might arguably reflect simple carelessness on Kant’s part, the reader may wish to skip them.]
27 In a letter of 1792, rather than equating sensibility – as of course he would not want to do – with the manner in which representations are in the subject insofar as it is affected by things, Kant says that we would more aptly characterize it by way of a contrast between that which in einem Erkenntnisse concerns only a relation (Beziehung) to the subject and the form of sensibility in that very same relation (in dieser Beziehung; my emphasis) to the object of (aufs Objekt der) Anschauung (letter to Beck of 20 January, 1792 [XI, 315]).17
17. Cf, [Kant, 1999, с. 400].
28 Notice how Kant does not put the point: he does not simply speak of the form of sensibility in a certain sort of mental state arising by way of affection, but rather of that form in the very relation to the subject involved in that affection. This most naturally suggests that empirical Anschauung is a kind of state effectuated within perceivers, one part or aspect of which is also a state (or manifold of states) effectuated within perceivers; but that correspondingly, independently of whatever might get added by way of intellect, there must be something of a different sort to be said about the other aspect of empirical Anschauung – the aspect that is distinct from facts about its arising from affection – and indeed something having precisely to do with one’s relation to an Objekt der Anschauung.
29 [In the following paragraph, I offer further argument for my reading of the Aesthetic. However, the reader will have by now at least gotten a sense of what I have in mind sufficient for continuing, and so might want to jump to the concluding paragraphs of this section.]
30 In a textual vacuum, all of this might arguably allow for a reduction of empirical “intuitings” precisely to affection by things, in turn externally related to representations whose (intellectual) form is simply not meant to be adequately characterized in the Aesthetic in the first place: the “something else” about such states would then lie in that external relation. But as already suggested, it seems to me difficult, on such a view, to make sense of the Aesthetic’s key notion of a directedness toward possible things, or locations for them, as contained within a space or time toward which one is thereby likewise directed. The dual “reference” both to some given appearance and a broader “appearance” indefinitely encompassing it would have to be grounded in a correspondingly dual dimension of the thought stimulated by the affection relation. Perhaps one might be inclined to appeal to the occurrence of a thought relating the given appearance to a broader spatial or temporal context. But it seems particularly difficult to see what, in a mere thought process, could ground anything more in turn than a mere thought that, in at least seeming to direct one’s attention precisely toward that broader context, – that is, toward some particular broader context – one is doing anything more than thinking that one is doing so. In any case, I venture to suggest that my own proposal about nestings of Anschauung within Anschauung provides a more natural suggestion with regard to the relation between directedness toward appearances and toward a more global “appearance” within which the latter are necessarily apprehended. In addition, we may note that at B129 Kant speaks of the form of Anschauung as nothing “other than the way in which the subject is affected” (emphasis added). And he says at B41 that the Anschauung by which we are related to the space and time within which we are able to be related to things is the subject’s “formal constitution for being affected by objects [Objekten] and thereby acquiring immediate representation, i.e., intuition, of them” (emphasis added). Thus the way in which we are affected such that we are able to be directly cognitively related to things of itself amounts to an aspect of any state thus arising, whereby it constitutes, just of itself, a way of being directly related to the space or time in which we are capable of representing those things. Surely this amounts to more than a mere affection to which various sorts of thoughts are capable of “responding.”
31 I conclude the present section by emphasizing what Kant says at the very beginning of the Aesthetic:
32 In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects [Gegenstände], that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end [or I would say better put, following Pluhar’s translation: “at which all thought aims as a means [als Mittel abzweckt]), is intuition. … since there is no other way in which objects can be given to us. (A19/B33)
33 To my mind, sufficient justice is rarely done to intuition as a “means” toward thought’s cognitive relation to things.18 One might of course take Kant simply to be saying that, inasmuch as thought cannot provide its own objects as real things, they need to be provided from elsewhere. But first, it would be unnatural to put this by saying that thought then needs to be directed towards that alternative source, as opposed to what is thereby provided. In addition, focusing on the demand for an alternative source suggests that the difficulty is simply that thought does not create its own objects as real things. Of course it does not, and Kant is concerned with that fact. But the difficulty is that what we are supposed to be concerned with is the possibility of thought being cognitively directed toward whatever it might or might not have created. That is the challenge raised at the beginning of the Aesthetic: how can mere thought single out, or “point” to, anything in particular at all? As we might put it: it won’t do thought any good if some other source is able to “provide,” say, visual things – unless cases of thinking were thereby made cases of seeing them. But in Kantian terms, as I rather propose, what we need is actually the opposite: that our power of thought must be able to affect, indeed must be able at least sufficiently to transform, intuitions so as to effectuate their also being cases of thinking. Postponing for now the question of what the latter could possibly amount to, what it seems to me this requires is that the Anschauung by whose means thought is able to refer to the relevant sort of things (things affecting, or capable of affecting, one’s senses) must have a directedness of its own – and indeed such a one as is able to be a case of directedness toward such things at least by virtue of the satisfaction of certain further conditions.19
18. This of course does not exclude an important sense in which thought is also intuition’s means toward cognitive relation to things.

19. Part of this paragraph is more or less directly taken from [Aquila, 2013, p. 9].
34 It is of course common enough to suppose that a thought might be regarded as referring to a particular thing, describable in terms conforming to that thought, simply by virtue of being in an appropriate way responsive to the affection of one’s senses by that thing (or by something appropriately related to it). But first, given that it is clearly not Kant’s view that the directedness toward something affecting one’s senses that is characteristic of a case of empirical Anschauung simply is the affection-relation in question, it is difficult to see why this would not merely amount to a case of thought being in some sense responsive to something, as opposed to actually referring to it. But apart from that, it would seem in any case strange to say that thought has then managed to refer to the thing in question by means of Anschauung – as opposed simply to saying: by means of sensation. Satisfaction of the affection-condition may be necessary for the relevant sort of directedness of thought. But it is, as I take Kant to be saying, sufficient only insofar as what the affection in question in the first instance gives rise to is a case of Anschauung, where the latter has at least some sort of directedness of its own – and again in particular, a directedness able to be a case of directedness toward the things in question at least by virtue of the satisfaction of certain further conditions, in their own turn provided by thought.
35 2. A Variety of Phenomenalisms The next question concerns the relationship between subjective appearances and empirically real things. As of course suggested by (PB), it seems to me that this may be most fruitfully addressed in terms of the question of the extent to which subjective appearances might also be regarded as ordinary, empirically real things. In turn, with respect to the prospects for an “intentional” view of the latter, it seems to me most useful to approach the matter in terms of the following distinction:
36 Reductive Phenomenalism Judgments of empirical reality express nothing more than the obtaining of various possibilities and necessities with respect to manifolds of appearances – characterized in whatever terms can be grounded solely in the notions of sensory “matter” and spatiotemporal “form” as they emerge from the Transcendental Aesthetic – in connection with some given appearance or appearances.
37 Non-Reductive Phenomenalism Reductive phenomenalism is false. Nonetheless, the empirical reality of empirically real things is nothing more than the obtaining of possibilities and necessities with respect to manifolds of appearances.
38 However, as I will suggest in section 4, it will be in order to consider the following view as well:
39 Transcendental Phenomenalism Non-reductive phenomenalism is true. Nonetheless, the cognitive conditions underlying the intelligibility of non-reductive phenomenalism render it at least conceivable that reference to empirically real things embodies some mode of directedness to things existing in themselves.20
20. In section 4, I distinguish this from Transcendental Idealism, defined in such a way as to be incompatible with reductive, but at least compatible with non-reductive phenomenalism.
40 The distinction between reductive and non-reductive phenomenalism, as I have just drawn it, is different from another that might more naturally come to mind. One might for example think of a reductive phenomenalism simply as saying that ordinary things are nothing more than (actual or possible) subjective appearances, without appreciating the sense in which those things are a construct “out of” subjective appearances. But the appeal to the notion of a “construct” does not do the justice that I think can be done, still compatibly with a phenomenalistic perspective, to the possibility of regarding otherwise merely subjectively regarded appearances as, individually, themselves ordinary empirically real things.
41 As noted earlier, this whole enterprise may seem misguided, and particularly so given the proposed view of subjective appearances. As merely “intentional Gegenstände” correlative with cases of aesthetic directedness, subjective appearances might seem necessarily to be altogether different from such things as tables and chairs. For they are, it might seem, the correlate of an altogether different kind of intentional directedness. We would at best be contemplating the swapping of one intentional Gegenstand for a different one (or again, perhaps for a mere “construct” out of such things). I try to meet this difficulty in the next section. I conclude this one simply by noting that, at least initially, both alternatives face the very problem to whose solution I take the matter/form doctrine of Anschauung to contribute in the first place: how is it possible for thought to regard appearances in any way at all? Answer: only insofar as cases of Anschauung are able to become thoughts.
42 3. The Transcendental Gegenstand = X
43 To meet the two-fold difficulty just formulated – how it is possible to take appearances in any way at all, given Kant’s strictures on the relationship between thought and sensibility; and how specifically, on an “intentional Gegenstand” view of them, any appearance might be taken in more than one way – we need to contrast the view of intentionality that I have drawn from Kant’s Aesthetic with what I take to be a more standard view. What I take to be a fairly standard view of the intentionality of the mental, insofar as the latter is meant to be at least compatible with merely intentional status for intentional Gegenstände, is what I will call the Content View.
44 On the Content View of intentionality, there is an aspect of certain mental states analogous to a text, or portion of a text. However we might in the end then explicate this analogy, the point is that, insofar as it permits us to regard the “text” borne by a mental state as saying (or supposing, or proposing, etc.) something, what that “something” is about can, quite apart from concern with its ontological status, be described as a Gegenstand of mental directedness. But precisely insofar as this is merely a correlate of what is “said,” alteration of the latter “content” would arguably alter the directedness in question.
45 By contrast, the sort of intentional directedness that I take to have been introduced in the Aesthetic is a pure form characterizing certain sorts of mental states. We might of course make sense of the idea that such states might also have a “content,” thereby given directedness toward something immediately presented (but in any instance possibly merely hallucinated). But the point is that transformation of any such content would not ipso facto amount to transformation of the directedness in question. So to this extent, even though we are speaking so far only on the intentional level, we need not regard the Gegenstand of some thought “applied” to an aesthetically directed mental state as something different from whatever might be supposed to have been the Gegenstand (or proto-Gegenstand) of the latter in the first place; or regard two different thoughts in principle applicable to a given aesthetically directed state as ipso facto thoughts about two different Gegenstände. For again, at least viewed as a possibly merely intentional Gegenstände, we are talking about a correlate, not of any mental “content” by way of which it might be intended in the first place, but of a pure form of mental directedness. And so in turn, the Kantian upshot would be that the “application” of whatever thoughts are thereby in question is to be regarded simply as a case of enrichment of a state possessed of such form, at most furnishing a “content” precisely thereby sharing in the directedness in question, i.e. precisely thereby directed toward the Gegenstand of that directedness.
46 But the crucial point is now that, in a very different sense, the possibility of application of one’s power of thought to Anschauung, as a “means” toward regarding things in various ways, must indeed effectuate a transformation of that Anschauung’s inherent directedness. As I shall propose, this is the crux of Kant’s discussion of the transcendental Gegenstand = X in the first-edition Transcendental Deduction.21
21. Space does not permit an attempt to speak to the significance (or relative insignificance) of the fact that Kant did not include this discussion in the second-edition version of the Deduction.
47 The relevant section of the Deduction begins – quite independently of questions regarding the identity of empirically real things – with that of the possibility of any sort of apprehension of identity on the Gegenstand-side of consciousness. In the case from which Kant begins, what is in question is simply the possibility of apprehending a given Vorstellung as a continuation of an antecedent one.
48 At the end of the section just preceding, dealing with the Synthesis of Reproduction in the Imagination, Kant reminds us that, at least so far, the “appearances” with which we are dealing “are not things in themselves, but rather the mere play of our representations” (A101). Then he turns to some examples of reproductive synthesis involving various sorts of representations:
49 Now it is obvious that if I draw a line in thought, or think of the time from one noon to the next, or even want to represent a certain number to myself, I must necessarily first grasp one of these manifold representations after another in my thoughts. But if I were always to lose the preceding representations (the first parts of the line, the preceding parts of time, or the successively represented units) from my thoughts and not reproduce them when I proceed to the following ones, then no whole representation … could ever arise. (A102)
50 And it is in this context that Kant introduces the discussion leading to the transcendental Gegenstand, setting up the issue in the following terms:
51 Without consciousness that that which we think is the very same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be in vain. For it would be a new representation in our current state, which would not belong at all to the act [Actus; as Guyer and Wood emphasize, “up to this point Kant has been using the word Handlung] through which it had been successively [nach und nach; following Guyer/Wood’s translation of that phrase in the next paragraph, but replacing their “gradually” at this point] generated (erzeugt). (A103)
52 Were Kant to have taken as an example a case of Anschauung through the medium of sensation – but, to preserve the emphasis on imagination, simply abstracting from the question of whether the relevant representation(s) might be mere hallucination – he might of course equally well have considered a case in which what seems to be a single appearance continues before our regard, perhaps all the while even itself undergoing a variety of changes. For the question would have been the same: how is it indeed possible to regard this as a single appearance – as we are clearly able to do without regard to whether or not it is a case of mere “imagination”?22
22. See note 10, above.
53 In any case, Kant makes it clear that he takes resolution of the general difficulty to turn on mobilization of an a priori, but now intellectual, form of mental directedness, over and above (but as I will suggest in a moment, not wholly distinct from) what the Aesthetic had highlighted as an a priori but purely sensible form of directedness. It is of course customary to take him to be thinking here of a form needing to be embodied in thoughts distinct from, but in some way responsive to, states of sensibility. I have already argued that it would be unfortunate if this were Kant’s view. For it would seem to leave him with the following choice: either the presumed responsiveness consists in a purely causal mechanism triggering such thoughts, and so with no clear reason why the latter should be supposed to embody any cognizance of what is triggering them; or the thoughts must of themselves be supposed to embody some level of cognizance, and to be in some way at least minimally directed toward, the sensible states in question, and so contradicting the dictum asserted at the beginning of the Aesthetic that it is sensible states that are in the first place the means by which thought achieves cognitively relevant directedness.
54 It seems to me that a close reading supports the view that what Kant has in mind is rather a certain sort of intellectual transformation, or intellectualization, precisely of the pure form of aesthetic directedness, whereby the latter itself takes on the sense of directedness toward something that, at any point, is at least in principle determinable as the “same thing” (or not) as something apparently “reproduced” (or anticipated).23 On this reading, Kant would thus find himself in effect required, to an extent that he did not in the Aesthetic, to bring to the fore the a priori form of directedness as such, apart from whatever might be said about the specific spatial and temporal context in which it is necessarily (but of course not by logical necessity) embedded in our own particular cognitive situation. Unfortunately, there was no standard philosophical terminology available to him for the purpose.24
23. This need not be taken to imply that there already was at hand at least some sense of sheer aesthetic directedness. However, I will suggest shortly that Kant may at least see the transformation in question as constituting a sense of directedness, or reference, that in some way contains a sense of sheer aesthetic directedness, albeit one of which one is generally thereby only “weakly” conscious.

24. See note 3, above.
55 The terminological strain is apparent at the very beginning of the discussion. Again, prior to the more specific question of the possibility of representation of empirically real things, given by way of a manifold of appearances thereof, Kant highlights the case of a series of representations at most supposed to be “reproductions” of representations previously present to consciousness. And he says, by implication, that without the special sort of unity of consciousness now about to be introduced, no member of such a series could constitute the relevant sort of “whole” or “unity” with its predecessors, because “it would be a new representation in our current state, which would not belong at all to the act [Actus] through which it had been successively [nach und nach] generated.”
56 This reference to the generation (Erzeugung) of a representation, and of an Actus whereby it is achieved, is repeated in the next paragraph (beginning with “The word ‘concept’ itself...”), which constitutes a kind of transition between the initial concern with mere “reproduction” and then finally, in the paragraph next again, with the question of “what is meant by the expression ‘an object [Gegenstand] of representations’” (A104) and the immediately related question of representation of a manifold of appearances as appearances of a single thing, at least insofar as this is supposed to be relevant to cognition possible for us. In at least the latter case, Kant takes it for granted that the relevant representation of identity always involves a concept and the special sort of consciousness of unity (and then as he proceeds to emphasize, also necessity) that a concept, at least so employed, embodies. He introduces the notion of such a concept as embodying just such (but of course also more than such) a unity of consciousness in the transitional paragraph, and speaks more specifically there of this consciousness as having two components:
57 The word “concept” itself could already lead us to this remark [i.e. Kant’s antecedent remark about consciousness of unity]. For it is this one consciousness that unifies the manifold that has been successively [nach und nach] intuited, and then also reproduced, into one representation. This consciousness may often only be weak, so that we connect it with the generation [Erzeugung] of the representation only in the effect, but not in the act [Actus] itself, i.e., immediately; but regardless of these differences one consciousness must always be found… (A103-4; italics added)
58 Applying the point to Kant’s ultimate target, the question of consciousness of a manifold of appearances – appearance otherwise at least in principle representable as at least possibly mere hallucinations – as appearance of a single thing, my proposal is of course that he is attempting to put forward the idea that the possibility of such consciousness is intimately connected with the possibility of consciousness of each of those appearance as itself that single thing. That may of course sound contradictory. How can we represent a manifold of distinct items as one and all identical with one and the same X? And that would indeed be a fatal problem if, regarded even as possible appearances of some X, we would have to suppose that the appearances in question are something “in themselves.” But immediately following the sentence announcing his concern with “what is meant by the expression ‘an object [Gegenstand] of representations,’” Kant is quick to emphasize that “We have said above that appearances themselves are nothing but sensible representations, which must not be regarded in themselves, in the same way, as Gegenstände.” In any case, the current proposal is more specifically this: consciousness of an appearance – again, otherwise in principle representable as at least possibly a mere appearance – as a single thing capable of appearing in manifold ways involves a full-blown action (Handlung) of intellectualization of what would otherwise be a purely sensible “act” of directedness of which the given appearance is in principle representable as a mere noematic correlate. This would thus be an intellectual action by which an original purely sensible “act” is not (or is no longer) a case of mere sensible directedness, but rather of full-blown mental reference to the given appearance, but now targeted precisely as something susceptible to various possible determinations. Correspondingly, consciousness of a given appearance as susceptible to such “targeting” in the first place would presumably involve at least some level of consciousness precisely of the underlying directedness thus intellectualized.
59 This seems to me to fit well with what Kant says. The Actus that “generates” an appearance as, at least in principle possibly, nothing but a “sensible representation” is of course on this reading the noesis with respect to which such an appearance, at least so regarded, is a mere noematic correlate. I am not aware of a philosopher prior to Kant trying to call attention to this as any sort of “act” at all on the part of a perceiver, let alone one of which one might be somehow conscious. But of course, at least apart from the question of consciousness of it, I have argued that Kant attempts to call attention to the need for its existence at the beginning of the Transcendental Aesthetic. It is presumably indeed not only an act of which one’s consciousness “may often only be weak,” but no doubt one which he regards as attended with merely “weak” consciousness even in a case of the sort of intellectualization to which he is now attempting to call our attention: a case where we would in any case most likely connect it “with the generation [Erzeugung] of the representation” only in “the effect,” that is, as I take it, only precisely in the very action of intellectualization.
60 And so, returning to the first in this sequence of paragraphs, we may recall what Kant had said about even the possibility of mere consciousness “that what we think is the very same as what we thought a moment before.” There he had said that a condition of such consciousness is not simply (of course) consciousness of a representation at one moment and of a representation at a subsequent moment. Beyond that, there is needed some sort of consciousness for which what would otherwise be only a series of distinct representations “belong to” one and the same Actus. Kant of course does not provide details about this particular sort of identification – presumably requiring an excursion into territory even more profound than that of his primary concern. But one thing seems clear in light of his description of the latter territory. Namely, quite apart from the specific conditions for representation of empirically real things, what is required even for mere consciousness “that what we think is the very same as what we thought a moment before” is an action of intellectualization of the fundamental pre-intellectual directedness of the mental, now determinable precisely as a continuation of such directedness, in such a way that (with its now intellectualized correlate), there is “one consciousness that unifies the manifold that has been successively intuited, and then also reproduced, into one representation” extended over time, as opposed to a mere series of distinct appearances to consciousness.
61 Of course, at least with respect to the representation of ordinary things, I have independently argued that this general approach is in effect demanded by the terms laid down at the beginning of the Aesthetic. According to those terms, the only thing that could possibly be indicated by Kant’s introduction of the transcendental Gegenstand = X, at least insofar as it is to be relevant to our ability to regard manifolds of appearances as appearances of things of which cognition is possible for us, is the need for incorporation of some sort of intellectual “content” right into the very cases of Anschauung by which those appearances are presentable in the first place. To that extent, whatever intellectual action is in question must have an “effect” upon Anschauung. It cannot consist in an action merely externally directed at the latter. What I have been arguing here, more specifically, concerns the most fundamental action in this regard. That action, Kant clearly wants to say, is expressed in an act of direct reference to something, call it X, of which some given appearance may always at least possibly be an appearance.
62 But the next problem, as Kant then sees it, is that there does not seem to be anything available to refer directly to, beyond what is directly presentable by way of Anschauung, and so beyond appearances themselves. There is of course in principle more than one way to deal with this problem. One of them would be a kind of phenomenalism that is to my mind more simplistic than that which I would suggest is Kant’s own view. But that would entail regarding the X in question as not really ever a Gegenstand at all, but at most a “logical construct” effected on the basis of the only sort of Gegenstände presentable to us. And, if that were Kant’s view, it seems to me that he could easily have found a clearer way to get it across. But matters are of course not so simple if what he is trying to get across is the demand that the X in question be something to which we are indeed capable of directly referring – itself a target of direct reference, and not simply a construct out of targets of (actual or possible) direct reference.
63 On the alternative that I have proposed, what is in question is always indeed a Gegenstand. But it is not one that is representable as distinct from those appearances that we take to be appearances of it, even in the (as we might put it) merely “logical” way that a logical construct is distinct from those items on the basis of which it is constructed. Rather, the X to which one refers, in regarding some appearance as an (immediate)25 appearance of it, is representable as “distinct” from that appearance only by way of some sort of consciousness of (on the noematic side) a transformation of it itself, as something present to one, correlative with some sort of (at least “weak”) consciousness (on the noetic side) of a transformation of the most basic transcendental condition of human cognition, as introduced by Kant at the beginning of the Aesthetic.26
25. I am of course setting aside the sense in which, for example, the apparent movements of one empirically real thing might be regarded as “appearances” of some other such thing.

26. This is of course not to deny that some sort of “reference” to other possible, or even under particular conditions necessary, appearances are also essential to the mode of representation now in question. A more simplistic version of phenomenalism will attend simply to this sort of “reference,” to the neglect of that upon which I take Kant to be attempting to focus in the present context.
64 Let us look at some additional passages from the Deduction’s discussion of the transcendental Gegenstand = X. First:
65 All representations, as representations, have their object [Gegenstand (and below)], and can themselves be objects of other representations in turn. Appearances are the only objects that can be given to us immediately, and that in them which is immediately related to the object is called intuition. However, these appearances are not things in themselves, but themselves only representations, which in turn have their object, which therefore cannot be further intuited by us, and that may therefore be called the non-empirical, i.e., transcendental object = X. (A108-9)
66 It seems to me natural, first, to see in this an attempt to get across the idea that the very appearances that can be appearances of something, and that are themselves the only things that can be given to us immediately, can themselves be Gegenstände of representations – and so presumably, in this particular context, precisely themselves of appearances.27 And of course – appearances being the only things that can be given to us immediately – it is significant that Kant also says, not that the Gegenstände of the appearances in question cannot be intuited by us, but that they cannot be further intuited by us. And too, why should he mention in this particular context that the appearances in question are not being regarded as things in themselves? But here we need simply ask how, if they were so regarded, we could coherently regard them both as possible appearances of Gegenstände and Gegenstände of possible appearances.
27. Presumably, Kant is not simply making the obvious point that they can be Gegenstände of cases of Anschauung.
67 Finally, I emphasize the following in this passage: “Appearances are the only objects that can be given to us immediately, and that in them [darin] which is immediately related to the object is called intuition” (A109). Here Kant is speaking of regarding appearances, which are again the only things that can be given to us immediately, as appearances of Gegenstände. But he is also speaking of something in appearances, so regarded, as immediately related (or as we may perhaps better say, immediately “referring”: unmittelbar auf den Gegenstand bezieht) to the things in question. And he calls this something “in” the appearances in question precisely Anschauung. Of course Kant does frequently refer to (generally, what I have called “subjective”) appearances as Anschauung; that is one of his several uses of the latter term. But here he is using the term to indicate something in appearances. What seems to me most natural in light of what I have argued so far is that he is here acknowledging precisely the noematic correlate – correlate precisely on the appearance-side – of what is on the noetic side the (normally “weakly” apprehended) form of aesthetic directedness, albeit now of course in its guise as genuine reference, as opposed to mere “directedness.”
68 And so consider also the following passage: “Now this concept cannot contain any determinate intuition at all, and therefore concerns nothing but that unity which must be encountered in a manifold of cognition insofar as it stands in relation to an object [Gegenstand]” (A109). Of course, in light of his ultimate concern – the possibility of reference to empirically real things – Kant gives particular attention in this section of the Critique to a unity specifically thought in terms of the subjection of a manifold of appearances to various rules (cf. A105-6). But this sort of unity – that of “combination” (Verbindung) with respect to a manifold of appearances – is hardly one that can be “encountered” (angetroffen) in (in!) a manifold of appearances (cf. B129 in § 15 of the second-edition Deduction). By contrast, insofar as a manifold of appearances are all thought as appearances of a single thing – and indeed, as all themselves one thing – by virtue of a condition prior to, and as a necessary condition for, occupation with the question of empirical reality, Kant appears to be telling us here that we are indeed dealing with some sort of unity “encountered” (even if only “weakly”) precisely in the appearances in question, namely as I have argued, precisely as the noematic correlate of the intellectualization of the pure form of directedness inherited from the Aesthetic. It is simply the purely “formal” (A105)28 unity of: this, this again (or this still), this yet again, etc.
28. Note that, whatever sort of unity of consciousness is involved in regarding a manifold of appearances, despite their distinctness, all as appearances of one empirically real thing, it would hardly be a merely “formal” matter. But the sort of unity of consciousness expressed in a reference to a manifold of (otherwise regarded) distinct appearances as all one and the same “thing,” without further qualification, might indeed be so characterized: it simply the “unity” of X, X again, X again, and so on, throughout some manifold of (as otherwise regarded) distinct appearances.
69 4. Implications for Possible Varieties of Phenomenalism
70 I have already anticipated one upshot of the proposed reading of Kant’s notion of the transcendental Gegenstand = X, that is, one upshot of the view that the latter simply gives voice to the need for transformation of the pure form of aesthetic directedness into that of genuine reference, as a condition of genuine cognizance of things, without any specification as to how such things might actually be “determined.” As Kant puts it: “It is easy to see that this object [Gegenstand] must be thought of only as something in general = X” (A104); it is (beyond being a target of reference)29 “nothing for us” (A105). In particular, given the extent of the indeterminateness of the transformation in question, considered just as such, there is at least nothing in the transcendental conditions of cognizance of empirical reality to exclude the possibility of taking what would otherwise be regarded as appearances of empirically real things as themselves empirically real things. Thus one upshot of the proposed reading is a theoretical underpinning for what I have called the Phenomenal Bivalence of Kantian appearances (PB).
29. Or perhaps beyond being the target of some sort of directedness of which one is at least “weakly” conscious as embodied in an act of genuine reference; see the comments on “Transcendental Phenomenalism” below.
71 We may now extend the point to the following, initially minimal, conclusion regarding phenomenalism. What I have in mind derives from the fact that the aesthetic directedness that is available for transforming into a case of genuine reference – the transformation in question, again, of itself neutral with respect particular determinations thereof – is altogether neutral with respect the ontological status of its target. It seems to me that the conclusion to be drawn from this is that, from the point of view of a Kantian transcendental analysis, the possibility of a phenomenalistic view of empirical reality is at the very least left open. For apart from analysis of the specific content of the concept , there is nothing in the underlying cognitive forms that requires regarding whatever X is in question as something in itself. (By the same token, to be sure, there is nothing in the underlying cognitive forms that prevents this. I return to this point below.)
72 My aim, however, is not to consider whether or not Kant is a phenomenalist, but only to bring out some new considerations as to ways in which he might possibly be one. In this regard, I therefore note an additional upshot of the argument of this paper, likewise already anticipated, namely, that Kant’s views about the transcendental conditions of cognizance of empirical reality not only leave open the possibility of some form of phenomenalism, but at least provide a grounding for a rejection of reductive phenomenalism.
73 I assume that any form of phenomenalism regards judgments of empirical reality as expressing nothing more than the obtaining of various possibilities and necessities with respect to manifolds of appearances, in connection with some given appearance or appearances. In defining what I earlier introduced as “reductive” phenomenalism, I in effect stipulated in addition that, as candidates for possible judgments of empirical reality, the relevant appearances are simply whatever (from a transcendental standpoint) can be regarded as “generated” (to put the point in terms that I later emphasized) solely by way of the incorporation of manifolds of sensation within mental states possessed of the pure form of aesthetic directedness, as these latter notions are grounded in the Transcendental Aesthetic. There may of course be various views as to what this involves – as well, to be sure, as resistance to the very idea that the Aesthetic promotes a notion of pre-intellectual mental directedness. But of course I have tried to defend the latter idea, while also acknowledging that Kant lacked the terminological resources to make it sufficiently clear.30
30. See note 3 above.
74 Here the crucial point is then this. Even if the empirical reality of an empirically real thing were to be phenomenalistically construed, it would remain the case that each of the appearances out of which its reality would have to be “constructed” – each of which, as I have argued, is itself to be regarded as the very thing in question – is itself to be regarded as at least in principle determinable in any number of ways – including, as I take it, determinability as not only being an empirically real thing, but also as something existing in itself. As I take it, at least this possibility would be part of the very meaning of those appearances, insofar as they are candidates for determination in any way at all, that is, insofar as they have undergone the necessary “enrichment” noematically correlative with transformation of sheer aesthetic directedness into genuine mental reference.
75 As I note in passing, and as I have argued elsewhere, further elements of the necessary “enrichment” of appearances also arguably lie in the need for aesthetically directed states to be able to contain, on a pre-intellectual level – and as something as internal to them as sensations are to empirical Anschauung – (i) manifolds of anticipations and retentions which might otherwise be deemed mere “associations” and (ii) manifolds of sub-states which also bear the pure form of aesthetic directedness. By virtue of at least the first of these points,31 one might even say that the appearances out of which the empirical reality of empirically real things would have to be “constructed,” per a Kantian phenomenalism, would have to be, in their very meaning for consciousness in the first place, not simply items at least in principle determinable in any number of ways – and so, as we might put it, at least in principle “proto-realities” of any number of sorts – but more specifically precisely proto-empirically real things.
31. Actually, the second of the two points would more reasonably be first in that relevantly incorporated “associations” must presumably be incorporated precisely within manifolds of sub-states within all-encompassing aesthetically directed mental states. In any case, as noted above, I have argued for (i) in [Aquila, 2013] and [Aquila, 1989]; and for (ii) in the former and also in [Aquila, 2003].
76 Of course, there may be independent exegetical grounds for refusing to regard Kantian appearances – even those regarded as empirically real things – as having any sort of existence in themselves: for example, grounds stemming from Kant’s claims regarding the non-spatiotemporality of things in themselves, combined with his claims to the effect that empirical reality does not simply appear to be spatiotemporal. This is an issue into which I do not enter in this paper. In any case I want to suggest, as a further upshot of our discussion so far, that we may need to give serious thought to a distinction between two different ways in which a properly Kantian phenomenalism might be regarded as compatible with granting some sort of existence in itself to empirically real things. To this end, I return to a position characterized earlier in the discussion:
77 Transcendental Phenomenalism Non-reductive phenomenalism is true. Nonetheless, the cognitive conditions underlying the intelligibility of non-reductive phenomenalism render it at least conceivable that reference to empirically real things embodies some mode of directedness to things existing in themselves.
78 Strictly speaking, the view that empirically real objects, even phenomenalistically construed, are also, or are also at least coherently determinable as, something in themselves might be regarded as a form of transcendental phenomenalism. In any case, I would like to offer a somewhat tentative suggestion as to a form of the view thus characterized that would allow denial that empirically real things are something in themselves. As may be gathered from the formulation of the view in question, the suggestion is of course not that reference to such things is, or even in any way “embodies,” reference to something existing in itself – which condition would be satisfied if empirically real things were indeed themselves, as regarded from the appropriate perspective, something in themselves. But a more controversial suggestion – about which I confess to not being very clear in my own mind – turns on still further appeal to the purely “formal” character of the transformation necessarily undergone by aesthetic directedness, insofar as it is to be transformed into a case of genuine mental reference.
79 With the possible exception of the special case of self-reference,32] I assume it is Kant’s view that, while we might think thoughts about non-spatiotemporal things in themselves, it is not possible for us actually to refer to any of them, except by way of (a) a “definite description” such as “the non-spatiotemporal thing in itself that is the creator of everything other than itself” (which, as should be clear, I am not considering a case of genuine “reference” in the present context) or (b) reference to some empirically real object, insofar as the latter might actually also be a non-spatiotemporal thing in itself (which is the proposal that we are currently setting aside).
32. Cf. [Howell, 2000
80 Might a neglected alternative possibly be the following? The point of the transformation involved in reference to the transcendental Gegenstand = X is precisely to bring to the fore the element of directedness inherited from the Aesthetic, but (purely formally regarded) just as such, that is, as a noetic achievement, or Actus, without regard to the necessary (but not logically necessary) attachment to it of what would be, insofar as it actually becomes a case of genuine reference, a correlative spatiotemporal context on the noematic side.33 In turn, as argued in section 3 in connection with a passage at A109, some sort of sense of such directedness is at least “weakly” present to consciousness precisely insofar as one is cognizant of appearances as targets of reference. As we might put it, we are then at least weakly aware of the reality of such directedness as in some way “embodied” in the pure form of mental reference. But if so, then there is, per properly Kantian constraints on human cognizance, perhaps arguably nothing to exclude the possibility of at least coherent thoughts (and beliefs) to the effect that, even if some empirically real object that is the actual object of reference on a given occasion is not something existing in itself (and so, something existing non-spatiotemporally), the very act of reference to it might embody a case of non-referential directedness not limited by the constraints of spatiotemporality.
33. That Kant has something like this “abstractive” regard in mind is arguably supported by his repeated use of the term ‘transcendental object,’ including in second-edition passages, to “refer,” to the extent possible, to the realm of non-spatiotemporal reality. Cf. A46/B63, A277/B333, A288/B344, A538/B566ff (Objekt in this last case, otherwise Gegenstand)..
81 To be sure, one further step would be needed to make the intended point, namely, granting the coherence of the thought that the non-referential directedness in question is actually a case of such directedness to something that is itself not limited by the constraints of spatiotemporality. But if that further thought is not in fact incoherent, we would then be entertaining what seems to me an interesting alternative to a standard “double aspect” reading of Kant. For in this case, what would be in question is a duality of aspects, not with respect to anything to which we are capable of referring, but rather precisely with respect to the very act of reference. We would be supposing, namely, that the latter harbors the duality of (a) actual reference to whatever is in fact its referent and (b) some sort of mere “directedness,” embodied by, or taken up into, (a) to something not constrained by the spatiotemporal limits on the referent in question.34
34. In any case, again, what is in question here is only the coherence of the thought, compatibly with Kantian transcendental constraints.
82 On the other hand, perhaps a more reasonable conclusion – and I hope at least to have made a case that it is not un-reasonable – would simply be that something like the line of thought put forth in this paper might serve as diagnosis of the thinking leading Kant to put things in the various, often seemingly contradicting, ways that he does with regard to things in themselves and appearances.
83 Apart from any specific concern with phenomenalism, I in any case conclude with a suggestion as to a possibly useful way of defining transcendental idealism:
84 Transcendental Idealism Any judgment of an appearance is a judgment with regard to something (as at least a noematic correlate) whose availability for such judgment is provided by an instance of mental directedness that leaves its ontological status open.
85 This seems to me to have the advantage of suggesting why one might speak here of “idealism,” while remaining neutral with regard to the question of phenomenalism. As I take it, it also has the advantage of doing this independently of the immediately preceding, somewhat speculative remarks concerning what I have called “transcendental phenomenalism.”35
35. I apologize to participants of the Workshop for the length of this paper. Since I will not be participating otherwise, it has allowed me to make points that it might otherwise have been possible for me to make in the live exchange of ideas.

Библиография

1. Aquila R.E. Is sensation the matter of appearances // Interpreting Kant / ed. M.S. Gram. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1982. P. 11–29.

2. Aquila R.E. Matter in Mind: A Study of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction // Philos. Phenomenol. Res. 1989. V. 51. № 4. P. 929–934.

3. Aquila R.E. Hans Vaihinger and Some Recent Intentionalist Readings of Kant // J. Hist. Philos. 2003. V. 41. № 2. P. 231–250.

4. Aquila R.E. Cartesian Consciousness and the Transcendental Deductionofthe Categories // Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus: Bewusstsein / eds. D. Emundts, S. Sedwick. Berlin: DE GRUYTER, 2013.

5. Aquila R.E. The Transcendental Idealisms of Kant and Sartre // Comparing Kant and Sartre / ed. S. Baiasu. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. P. 217–256.

6. Howell R. Kant, the I Think, and Self-Awareness // Kant’s Legacy. Essays in Honor of Lewis White BeckUniv / ed. P. Ciovacki. Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2000. P. 117–152.

7. Kant I. Critique of Pure Reason / eds. P. Guyer, A. Wood. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

8. Kant I. Critique of Pure Reason / eds. P. Kitcher, W.S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub Co, 1996.

9. Kant I. Correspondence / ed. A. Zweig. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

10. Kant I. Notes and Fragments / eds. P. Guyer, C. Bowman, F. Rauscher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

11. Kant I. Theoretical Philosophy after 1781 / eds. H. Allison, P. Heath, G. Hatfield, and M. Friedman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

12. Sellars W. Science and metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968.

Комментарии

Сообщения не найдены

Написать отзыв
Перевести